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Abstract
Poultry	can	become	infected	with	low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	(LPAI)	viruses	via	
(in)direct	contact	with	 infected	wild	birds	or	by	transmission	of	 the	virus	between	
farms.	This	study	combines	routinely	collected	surveillance	data	with	genetic	analysis	
to	assess	the	contribution	of	between-farm	transmission	to	the	overall	incidence	of	
LPAI	virus	infections	in	poultry.	Over	a	10-year	surveillance	period,	we	identified	35	
potential	cases	of	between-farm	transmission	in	the	Netherlands,	of	which	10	formed	
geographical	clusters.	A	total	of	21	LPAI	viruses	were	 isolated	from	nine	potential	
between-farm	transmission	cases,	which	were	further	studied	by	genetic	and	epide-
miological	analysis.	Whole	genome	sequence	analysis	 identified	close	genetic	 links	
between	 infected	 farms	 in	seven	cases.	The	presence	of	 identical	deletions	 in	 the	
neuraminidase	stalk	region	and	minority	variants	provided	additional	indications	of	
between-farm	transmission.	Spatiotemporal	analysis	demonstrated	that	genetically	
closely	related	viruses	were	detected	within	a	median	time	interval	of	8	days,	and	the	
median	distance	between	the	infected	farms	was	significantly	shorter	compared	to	
farms	 infected	with	genetically	distinct	 viruses	 (6.3	versus	69.0	km;	p	<	0.05).	The	
results	further	suggest	that	between-farm	transmission	was	not	restricted	to	hold-
ings	of	the	same	poultry	type	and	not	related	to	the	housing	system.	Although	sepa-
rate	introductions	from	the	wild	bird	reservoir	cannot	be	excluded,	our	study	indicates	
that	 between-farm	 transmission	 occurred	 in	 seven	 of	 nine	 virologically	 analysed	
cases.	Based	on	these	findings,	 it	 is	 likely	that	between-farm	transmission	contrib-
utes	considerably	to	the	incidence	of	LPAI	virus	infections	in	poultry.
K E Y W O R D S
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genetic	analysis
1  | INTRODUC TION
Avian	influenza	(AI)	is	a	highly	contagious	viral	disease	that	affects	
birds.	Avian	influenza	viruses	are	widespread	in	wild	waterfowl	that	
form	the	natural	reservoir	of	AI	viruses	(Stallknecht	&	Shane,	1988),	
and	can	occasionally	be	transmitted	to	commercial	poultry.	The	vi-
ruses	 carry	 two	 surface	 glycoproteins,	 haemagglutinin	 (HA)	 and	
neuraminidase	(NA),	which	are	used	for	virus	classification	(Webster,	
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Bean,	Gorman,	Chambers,	&	Kawaoka,	1992).	 In	birds,	16	HA	(H1-
H16)	and	9	NA	(N1-N9)	subtypes	have	been	identified	(Fouchier	et	
al.,	2005;	Olsen	et	al.,	2006).
Most	AI	viruses	are	 low	pathogenic	avian	 influenza	 (LPAI)	virus	
strains	that	cause	subclinical	 infections	in	poultry	(Webster	&	Rott,	
1987).	In	some	cases,	mild	respiratory	disease,	a	reduction	in	egg	pro-
duction	or	low	mortality	is	observed	(Gonzales	&	Elbers,	2018).	Avian	
influenza	viruses	of	subtypes	H5	and	H7	pose	the	greatest	threat	to	
commercial	poultry	because	of	 their	potential	 to	evolve	 into	highly	
pathogenic	 avian	 influenza	 (HPAI)	 viruses.	Highly	 pathogenic	 avian	
influenza	viruses	typically	cause	severe	illness	and	high	mortality	in	
poultry	(Webster	&	Rott,	1987),	and	some	subtypes	have	been	shown	
to	also	infect	humans	(Fouchier	et	al.,	2004;	Kruy,	Buisson,	&	Buchy,	
2008).	Hence,	surveillance	programmes	are	implemented	for	the	early	
detection	of	LPAI	and	HPAI	viruses	of	subtypes	H5	and	H7,	which	are	
also	known	as	notifiable	AI	strains.	In	the	Netherlands,	poultry	farms	
are	screened	serologically	for	AI	virus	infections	at	least	once	a	year	
(Bouwstra	et	al.,	2017;	Gonzales	et	al.,	2010).	In	addition,	virological	
testing	is	performed	upon	notification	of	AI	suspicions	based	on	clin-
ical	signs	or	the	detection	of	antibodies	against	H5	or	H7	subtyped	
viruses.	Non-notifiable	LPAI	virus	infections	are	often	considered	to	
be	of	 lower	risk.	However,	their	circulation	in	poultry	may	promote	
the	emergence	of	 influenza	virus	strains	that	have	the	ability	to	be	
transmitted	 efficiently	 among	 poultry	 and	 even	 humans	 (Li	 et	 al.,	
2014).	Reassortment	of	these	viruses	with	more	pathogenic	strains	
may	have	serious	consequences	for	both	animal	and	public	health.
Although	wild	birds	are	considered	the	primary	source	of	AI	virus	
infections	in	poultry,	flocks	may	also	become	infected	by	subsequent	
spread	 between	 farms.	 Recent	 HPAI	 outbreaks	 have	 demonstrated	
that	 AI	 viruses	 can	 spread	 rapidly	 between	 farms	 (Dargatz,	 Beam,	
Wainwright,	 &	 McCluskey,	 2016;	 Guinat	 et	 al.,	 2018;	 Stegeman	 et	
al.,	 2004),	 leading	 to	 huge	 economic	 losses	 in	 the	 poultry	 industry.	
Sustained	between-farm	 transmission	of	 LPAI	viruses	has	also	been	
observed	 in	commercial	poultry,	 for	example,	during	LPAI	outbreaks	
of	subtypes	H7N2	(1996–1998	and	2001–2002)	in	the	United	States	
(Akey,	2003;	Davison,	Eckroade,	&	Ziegler,	2003;	Dunn	et	al.,	2003;	
Ziegler,	Davison,	Acland,	&	Eckroade,	1999);	H7N1	(1999	and	2000–
2001),	H7N3	(2002–2003	and	2004)	and	H5N2	(2010–2012)	in	poul-
try-dense	areas	 in	Italy	 (Capua	&	Alexander,	2004;	Capua,	Mutinelli,	
Marangon,	&	Alexander,	2000;	Mughini-Gras	et	al.,	2014);	and	recur-
rent	outbreaks	of	H9N2	 infections	 in	Asia	and	the	Middle	East	 (late	
1990s–present)	(Capua	&	Alexander,	2004;	Gu,	Xu,	Wang,	&	Liu,	2017).
Various	 routes	 of	 between-farm	 transmission	 have	 been	 sug-
gested,	such	as	direct	contact	between	poultry	or	indirect	via	the	
movement	of	persons	(e.g.	visitors,	farm	personnel),	contaminated	
materials	(e.g.	farm	equipment,	clothing)	or	vectors	(e.g.	rodents,	in-
sects)	between	farms	(Leibler,	Carone,	&	Silbergeld,	2010;	Thomas	
et	 al.,	 2005;	 Velkers,	 Blokhuis,	 Veldhuis	 Kroeze,	 &	 Burt,	 2017;	
Vieira,	 Hofacre,	 Smith,	 &	 Cole,	 2009;	 Wanaratana	 et	 al.,	 2013).	
Moreover,	transmission	over	short	distances	may	occur	when	the	
virus	is	dispersed	into	the	environment	via	water,	air	or	dust	(Brown,	
Goekjian,	Poulson,	Valeika,	&	Stallknecht,	2009;	Horm,	Gutierrez,	
Sorn,	&	Buchy,	2012;	Jonges	et	al.,	2015;	Spekreijse,	Bouma,	Koch,	
&	Stegeman,	2013).	Geographical	clustering	of	infected	farms	im-
plies	the	occurrence	of	transmission	between	neighbouring	farms	
or	 separate	 introductions	 from	 the	 same	 environmental	 source	
(Boender	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Mulatti,	 Bos,	 Busani,	Nielen,	&	Marangon,	
2010).	However,	the	exact	route	of	introduction	into	poultry	often	
remains	 untraced	 and	 mechanisms	 underlying	 between-farm	
spread	of	AI	viruses	are	not	clearly	understood.
Genetic	 analysis	 has	 frequently	 been	 used	 to	 study	 the	 emer-
gence,	evolution	and	between-farm	transmission	dynamics	of	HPAI	
viruses	(Bataille,	van	der	Meer,	Stegeman,	&	Koch,	2011;	Fusaro	et	
al.,	2016;	Xu	et	al.,	2016;	Ypma	et	al.,	2013).	Similar	studies	for	LPAI	
are	limited	by	the	lack	of	genetic	information,	in	particular	for	non-
notifiable	AI	strains.	Low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	virus	infections	
may	remain	unnoticed	or	are	not	reported	because	the	mild	symp-
toms	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 caused	 by	 other	 poultry	 diseases	 (Elbers,	
Gorgievski-Duijvesteijn,	Zarafshani,	&	Koch,	2010).	Therefore,	LPAI	
viruses	are	primarily	detected	during	routine	serological	screening	
without	confirmation	by	virus	detection.	For	this	reason,	the	contri-
bution	of	between-farm	transmission	to	the	occurrence	of	LPAI	virus	
infections	in	poultry	is	largely	unknown.
This	 study	 combines	 routinely	 collected	 surveillance	 data	
with	genetic	analysis	to	assess	the	contribution	of	between-farm	
transmission	 to	 the	 overall	 incidence	 of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	 in	
poultry.	We	 analysed	 220	 serological	 and	 virological	 detections	
of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	 that	 occurred	 in	 commercial	 poultry	 in	
the	 Netherlands	 between	 2006	 and	 2016,	 to	 identify	 potential	
between-farm	transmission	cases.	Spatial	analysis	was	performed	
for	 each	 potential	 between-farm	 transmission	 case	 separately	
to	 determine	 whether	 infected	 farms	 clustered	 geographically.	
Subsequently,	 whole	 genome	 sequence	 analysis	 was	 performed	
to	 determine	 the	 genetic	 relationship	 between	 viruses	 isolated	
from	potential	 between-farm	 transmission	 cases.	Genetic	 analy-
sis	was	 combined	with	 information	 regarding	 time,	 distance	 and	
poultry	type	to	identify	epidemiological	variables	associated	with	
between-farm	 transmission.	 Better	 understanding	 of	 LPAI	 virus	
transmission	routes	into	poultry	and	between	farms	is	important	
to	control	virus	spread	in	an	early	stage.
2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Ethical statement
Poultry	 blood	 and	 swab	 samples	 were	 collected	 as	 part	 of	 the	
national	 AI	 surveillance	 program	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 which	 is	
carried	out	for	detecting	LPAI	virus	infections	of	H5	and	H7	sub-
types	in	poultry.	Samples	were	taken	by	authorized	veterinarians	
and	sent	to	the	laboratory	for	routine	diagnosis	of	AI	virus	infec-
tions.	 Sampling	 of	 poultry	 was	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	 with	
Council	Directive	2005/94/EC	of	20	December	2005	on	European	
Union	measures	 for	 the	 control	 of	 AI	 (EU,	 2005)	 and	 regulation	
TRCJZ/2005/1411	 of	 7	 June	 2005	 concerning	 the	 prevention,	
control	 and	 monitoring	 of	 infectious	 animal	 diseases,	 zoonoses	
and	transmissible	spongiform	encephalopathies	(TSEs).	This	study	
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analyses	the	test	results	obtained	in	the	surveillance	program.	No	
new	samples	were	collected	for	this	study	specifically.
2.2 | Study population
Samples	 were	 collected	 between	 January	 2006	 and	 September	
2016.	 The	 study	 population	 involved	 2,379	 commercial	 poul-
try	 farms	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 consisting	of	 farms	holding	broiler	
chickens	 (46%),	 layer	 chickens	 (42%),	 chicken	breeders	 (8%),	 tur-
keys	(2%)	and	domestic	ducks	(2%),	with	45,000	animals	per	farm	
on	average,	as	registered	in	2013	with	moderate	fluctuations	over	
the	study	period.
2.3 | Serological monitoring
For	serological	monitoring,	blood	samples	were	collected	from	all	
commercial	poultry	 farms	 in	 the	Netherlands	once	a	year,	except	
outdoor	layer	chicken	and	turkey	farms,	which	were	sampled	four	
times	a	year	and	each	production	cycle	respectively.	Screening	of	
serum	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 influenza-specific	 antibodies	was	 per-
formed	by	the	GD	Animal	Health	Service	using	the	FlockChek	AI	
MultiS-Screen	 Ab	 Test	 Kit	 (IDEXX).	 Samples	 identified	 as	 posi-
tive	 for	 influenza-specific	 antibodies	 were	 subsequently	 tested	
by	 the	 national	 reference	 laboratory	 Wageningen	 Bioveterinary	
Research	(WBVR)	in	a	H5	and	H7	subtype-specific	haemagglutina-
tion	inhibition	(HI)	test	according	to	the	OIE	Manual	of	Standards	
for	 Diagnostic	 Tests	 and	 Vaccines	 (OIE	 World	 Organisation	 for	
Animal	Health,	2015).	 If	no	antibodies	against	virus	 subtypes	H5	
or	H7	were	detected,	the	subtype	specificity	of	the	antibodies	was	
determined	using	an	in-house	protein	microarray	or	a	bead-based	
multiplexed	 immunoassay	 of	 HA	 and	 NA	 antigens.	 Results	 were	
confirmed	using	influenza	subtype-specific	HI	tests,	neuraminidase	
inhibition	(NI)	tests	and	NA-specific	enzyme-linked	immunosorbent	
assays	(ELISAs)	(OIE	World	Organisation	for	Animal	Health,	2015).
2.4 | Virological monitoring
Virological	monitoring	was	performed	to	check	for	virus	circulation	
upon	detection	of	antibodies	against	H5	and	H7	subtyped	viruses	or	
in	case	of	clinical	notification.	Tracheal	and	cloacal	swabs	were	col-
lected	by	a	specialist	team	of	the	Netherlands	Food	and	Consumer	
Product	Safety	Authority	(NVWA).	These	samples	were	analysed	by	
WBVR	using	 the	 real-time	 reverse	 transcription	 polymerase	 chain	
reaction	method	targeting	the	matrix	gene	(M-PCR)	(Fouchier	et	al.,	
2000).	 Influenza	 virus-positive	 samples	 were	 subsequently	 tested	
in	 a	H5	 and	H7	 subtype-specific	PCR	 (Slomka	et	 al.,	 2007,	 2009).	
The	sequence	of	the	HA	proteolytic	cleavage	site	was	analysed	to	
determine	 the	pathogenicity	 of	 the	 virus	 (Gall,	Hoffmann,	Harder,	
Grund,	&	Beer,	2008).	Amplified	HA	and	NA	gene	fragments	were	
analysed	by	Sanger	sequencing	to	determine	the	virus	subtype	(Gall	
et	al.,	2008,	2009).	To	isolate	viruses,	swab	samples	were	inoculated	
into	 the	allantoic	cavity	specific-pathogen-free	 (SPF)	embryonated	
chicken	 eggs	 (ECEs)	 (OIE	 World	 Organisation	 for	 Animal	 Health,	
2015).	Allantoic	fluids	positive	for	haemagglutination	were	charac-
terized	in	a	HI	test	using	in-house	prepared	antisera.
2.5 | Sequencing
Whole	genome	sequences	of	LPAI	viruses	were	generated	by	next-
generation	 sequencing	 (NGS),	 as	 described	previously	 (Beerens	 et	
al.,	 2017).	 In	 short,	 RNA	was	 purified	 from	 swab	 specimen	 or	 al-
lantoic	 fluid	 using	 the	High	 Pure	Viral	 RNA	Kit	 (Roche),	 amplified	
using	 universal	 primers	 and	 sequenced	with	 a	minimum	 sequence	
coverage	of	1,000	 reads	using	 the	paired-end	200	 Illumina	MiSeq	
platform.	Consensus	 sequences	were	 generated	 in	CLC	Genomics	
Workbench	 (Qiagen)	 using	 a	 reference-based	method	 (Beerens	 et	
al.,	2017)	and	submitted	to	GISAID's	EpiFlu	database	(https://www.
gisaid.org)	(Shu	&	McCauley,	2017)	(Table	S1).	A	recent	study	identi-
fied	a	limit	of	0.5%	for	reliable	detection	of	minority	variants	in	the	
influenza	virus	genome,	based	on	the	error	rate	of	the	NGS	proce-
dure	(Van	den	Hoecke,	Verhelst,	Vuylsteke,	&	Saelens,	2015).	In	this	
study,	we	used	a	minimum	frequency	of	2.0%	and	a	minimum	cover-
age	of	1,000	reads,	to	ensure	reliable	detection	of	minority	variants.
2.6 | Data analysis
Potential	between-farm	transmission	cases	were	defined	as	two	or	
more	poultry	 farms	 testing	positive	 for	LPAI	virus	 infection	of	 the	
same	HA/NA	subtype	within	a	time	interval	between	two	consecu-
tive	detections	of	maximum	6	months.	To	 identify	 statistically	 sig-
nificant	 spatial	 clusters	 of	 infected	 farms,	 spatial	 cluster	 analysis	
was	 performed	 using	 the	 free	 software	 program	 SaTScan	 version	
9.6	 (http://www.satscan.org)	 (Kulldorff,	 1997)	 for	 each	 potential	
between-farm	 transmission	 case	 separately.	 Input	 data	 were	 rep-
resented	 by	 the	 background	 poultry	 farm	 population	 (variable	 0),	
infected	farms	(variable	1)	and	geographical	 locations	of	 individual	
farms	specified	as	Cartesian	coordinates.	The	Bernoulli	probability	
model	was	used	to	scan	for	areas	with	a	higher	rate	of	infected	farms	
than	would	 be	 expected	 by	 chance	 (p	<	0.05).	 Geographical	maps	
were	generated	using	the	statistical	software	package	R	version	3.4.0	
(R	Core	Team,	2017).	Comparison	of	 time	 intervals	 between	virus	
detections	and	distances	between	infected	farms	was	performed	by	
using	the	non-parametric	Wilcoxon	rank	sum	test,	with	significance	
defined	as	p	<	0.05.	Genetic	analysis	was	performed	by	aligning	the	
nucleotide	consensus	sequences	for	each	gene	segment	separately	
in	CLC	Genomics	Workbench	(Qiagen).	These	alignments	were	used	
to	calculate	the	nucleotide	sequence	identities	between	viruses	and	
identify	minority	variants	at	consensus-level	variant	sites.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Identification of potential between‐farm 
transmission cases
To	identify	potential	between-farm	transmission	cases,	we	analysed	
220	 serological	 and	 virological	 detections	 of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	
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that	 occurred	 in	 commercial	 poultry	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 between	
2006	and	2016,	which	 included	162	seropositive	and	58	viroposi-
tive	 farms.	 Of	 the	 virologically	 confirmed	 infections,	 the	 genome	
sequence	of	42	LPAI	viruses	was	obtained.	Over	the	10-year	surveil-
lance	period,	we	identified	35	potential	between-farm	transmission	
cases	 involving	132	farms,	 including	111	seropositive	and	21	viro-
positive	farms	(Figure	1;	Table	S2).	Potential	between-farm	transmis-
sion	cases	involved	various	subtypes,	of	which	some	were	detected	
in	multiple	years,	for	example,	H7N7	(2006,	2011,	2013	and	2015),	
H8N4	(2009,	2011,	2012,	2013	and	2015),	H6N2	(2013,	2014	and	
2015),	H6N8	(2011,	2012	and	2013)	and	H9N2	(2010	and	2015).	A	
total	of	10	spatial	clusters	were	identified	(referred	to	as	clusters	A–J)	
(Table	S3).	Cluster	radii	ranged	from	0.1	to	5.9	km,	with	a	median	ra-
dius	of	1.5	km.	Seven	clusters	included	2–3	infected	farms	(clusters	
A,	C,	D,	E,	H,	I	and	J),	and	three	clusters	included	5–7	infected	farms	
(clusters	 B,	 F	 and	 G).	 Most	 clusters	 were	 found	 in	 poultry-dense	
areas	in	the	southern	(clusters	B,	C,	G	and	I)	and	central	(clusters	A,	F	
and	J)	part	of	the	Netherlands,	whereas	some	clusters	(clusters	D,	E	
and	H)	were	found	in	areas	with	a	low	poultry	density.	Geographical	
clustering	of	infected	farms	indicates	potential	transmission	of	LPAI	
viruses	between	neighbouring	farms	or	separate	introductions	from	
the	same	environmental	source.
3.2 | Genetic analysis of potential between‐farm 
transmitted viruses
Next-generation	sequencing	 was	 performed	 to	 analyse	 poten-
tial	 transmissions	 between	 farms	 genetically.	 The	 LPAI	 virus	 se-
quences	were	obtained	from	21	viropositive	farms	involved	in	nine	
potential	 between-farm	 transmission	 cases	 (Table	 S1).	 In	 five	 of	
these	cases,	 two	or	more	viropositive	 farms	were	 located	within	
the	same	spatial	cluster	(clusters	B,	C,	D,	E	and	G).	The	collection	
locations	of	the	21	LPAI	viruses	were	plotted	in	a	geographical	map	
of	the	Netherlands	(Figure	2a).
After	 the	 whole	 genome	 sequences	 were	 determined,	 ge-
netic	analysis	was	performed	by	aligning	 the	nucleotide	consen-
sus	 sequences	 of	 potentially	 between-farm	 transmitted	 viruses	
for	 each	 gene	 segment	 separately	 (Figure	 2b).	 Viruses	 isolated	
from	 potential	 cases	 H1N5-2007,	 H10N7-2009,	 H6N1-2010,	
H10N9-2012,	H5N3-2013	and	H6N2-2014	shared	nucleotide	se-
quence	identities	of	99.70%–100.00%	in	all	eight	gene	segments.	
Additionally,	 viruses	 isolated	 from	 potential	 cases	 H1N5-2007	
and	 H10N7-2009	 both	 contained	 a	 deletion	 in	 the	 stalk	 region	
of	the	NA	protein	of	18	and	21	amino	acids	respectively.	Viruses	
H7N7-2011-2	 and	 H7N7-2011-3	 also	 showed	 less	 than	 0.3%	
F I G U R E  1  Geographical	map	of	potential	between-farm	transmission	cases.	Map	of	the	Netherlands	showing	the	geographical	
distribution	of	commercial	poultry	farms	(open	dots)	(n	=	2,379),	farms	infected	with	low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	(LPAI)	virus	(filled	dots)	
(n	=	220),	farms	involved	in	potential	between-farm	transmission	cases	(blue)	(n	=	132)	and	statistically	significant	spatial	clusters	(red)	
(n	=	10),	including	close-up	maps	of	10	spatial	clusters	of	seropositive	farms	(green)	and	viropositive	farms	(yellow)	within	potential	between-
farm	transmission	cases	H7N7-2006	(a),	H1N5-2007	(b),	H10N7-2009	(c),	H6N1-2010	(d),	H7N7-2011	(e),	H8N4-2011	(f),	H10N9-2012	(g),	
H6N8-2012	(h),	H8N4-2012	(i)	and	H9N2-2015	(j).	Spatial	cluster	analysis	was	performed	for	each	potential	between-farm	transmission	case	
separately	using	the	Bernoulli	probability	model	(p	<	0.05).	All	samples	were	collected	as	part	of	the	national	avian	influenza	(AI)	surveillance	
program	in	the	Netherlands	between	January	2006	and	September	2016
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
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nucleotide	 sequence	divergence	 in	 each	gene	 segment,	whereas	
virus	H7N7-2011-1	showed	high	sequence	identities	with	viruses	
H7N7-2011-2	and	H7N7-2011-3	in	gene	segments	encoding	poly-
merase	basic	protein	1	(PB1),	polymerase	acidic	protein	(PA),	HA,	
NA,	matrix	protein	(MP)	and	non-structural	protein	(NS)	(99.44%–
100.00%),	but	relatively	low	sequence	identities	in	gene	segments	
encoding	polymerase	basic	protein	2	(PB2)	and	nucleoprotein	(NP)	
(93.79%–95.85%).
Low	sequence	identities	were	found	between	viruses	isolated	
from	 potential	 cases	 H8N4-2011	 and	 H7N7-2013.	 H8N4-2011	
viruses	showed	high	sequence	identities	 in	NP	and	MP	(99.60%),	
but	 relatively	 low	 sequence	 identities	 in	 PB2,	 PB1,	 PA,	 HA	 and	
NA	 (93.81%–98.35%).	 For	 NS,	 only	 53.84%	 sequence	 identity	
was	 observed,	 demonstrating	 that	 the	 viruses	 have	 distinct	 NS	
alleles.	H7N7-2013	viruses	shared	relatively	low	sequence	identi-
ties	(<98.70%)	in	all	gene	segments,	showing	that	the	viruses	were	
only	distantly	 related.	Altogether,	whole	genome	sequence	anal-
ysis	identified	highly	similar	viruses,	sharing	nucleotide	sequence	
identities	 of	 99.70%–100.00%	 in	 all	 gene	 segments,	 in	 seven	 of	
nine	 potential	 cases	 involving	 16	 farms.	 As	 seven	 farms	 can	 be	
considered	primary	infected	farms,	these	results	suggest	that	9	of	
21	viropositive	farms	may	have	become	infected	by	between-farm	
virus	transmission.
3.3 | Identification of minority variants
NGS	was	applied	to	detect	minority	variants	arising	from	biological	
variation	in	the	virus	population.	Minority	variants	were	analysed	for	
all	16	genetically	closely	related	viruses	isolated	from	seven	poten-
tial	between-farm	transmission	cases	using	a	minimum	frequency	of	
2.0%	and	a	minimum	coverage	of	1,000	reads	(Table	1;	Table	S4).	The	
average	coverage	was	4,500	reads	per	nucleotide	position.	Shared	
minority	variants	were	detected	at	two	nucleotide	positions	in	two	
potential	cases,	that	is	at	nucleotide	position	1,017	in	the	HA	gene	of	
viruses	H10N7-2009-1	and	H10N7-2009-2	(frequencies	of	3%)	and	
nucleotide	position	1,202	in	the	NP	gene	of	viruses	H10N9-2012-2	
and	H10N9-2012-3	(frequencies	of	7	and	10%	respectively).
More	often,	minority	variants	were	identified	at	sites	that	differed	
between	the	consensus	sequences	of	two	aligned	viruses,	with	fre-
quencies	ranging	from	2%	to	47%.	In	potential	cases	H1N5-2007	and	
H7N7-2011,	minority	variants	were	identified	at	all	sites	that	varied	
at	consensus	level,	making	a	transmission	event	between	these	farms	
highly	plausible.	In	addition,	a	relatively	high	number	of	nucleotide	vari-
ants	were	found	in	the	viral	subpopulation	of	H10N9-2012-3,	which	
were	present	in	the	consensus	sequence	of	virus	H10N9-2012-1.	In	
potential	 case	 H6N2-2014,	 all	 nucleotide	 variants	 detected	 in	 the	
viral	 subpopulation	 of	 H6N2-2014-1	 were	 fixed	 in	 the	 consensus	
F I G U R E  2  Genetic	analysis	of	potential	between-farm	transmission	cases.	(a)	Geographical	map	of	the	Netherlands	showing	the	
collection	locations	of	low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	(LPAI)	viruses	isolated	from	potential	between-farm	transmission	cases	(n	=	21).	
(b)	Genetic	analysis	of	LPAI	viruses	isolated	from	potential	between-farm	transmission	cases,	showing	the	presence	of	deletions	in	the	
neuraminidase	(NA)	stalk	region	and	the	percentage	of	nucleotide	sequence	identity	between	viruses	for	each	gene	segment	separately.	
All	samples	were	collected	as	part	of	the	national	avian	influenza	(AI)	surveillance	program	in	the	Netherlands	between	January	2006	
and	September	2016.	Detailed	information	on	the	virus	sequences	is	provided	in	Table	S1.	HA,	haemagglutinin;	MP,	matrix	protein;	NA,	
neuraminidase;	NP,	nucleoprotein;	NS,	non-structural	protein;	PA,	polymerase	acidic	protein;	PB1,	polymerase	basic	protein	1;	PB2,	
polymerase	basic	protein	2
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sequence	of	viruses	H6N2-2014-2	and	H6N2-2014-3.	The	detection	
of	shared	minority	variants	and	minority	variants	at	consensus-level	
variant	sites	provides	additional	indications	that	transmission	of	LPAI	
viruses	between	poultry	farms	occurred.
3.4 | Epidemiological variables associated with 
between‐farm transmission
Genetic	analysis	was	combined	with	information	regarding	time,	dis-
tance	and	poultry	type	to	identify	epidemiological	variables	associ-
ated	with	between-farm	transmission	(Table	2).	Genetically	closely	
related	viruses	were	isolated	within	a	median	time	interval	of	8	days	
(range	 1–36	days),	which	was	 lower	 but	 not	 significantly	 different	
from	that	of	the	genetically	distinct	viruses	(median	time	interval	of	
43	days;	range	6–62	days)	(p	=	0.06).	The	median	distance	between	
the	 collection	 locations	 of	 genetically	 closely	 related	 viruses	 was	
6.3	km	 (range	 0.6–68.9	km),	 which	 was	 significantly	 shorter	 com-
pared	to	that	of	the	genetically	distinct	viruses	(median	distance	of	
69.0	km;	range	41.3–72.3	km)	(p	<	0.05).	Genetically	closely	related	
viruses	 isolated	 from	 potential	 cases	 H1N5-2007,	 H10N7-2009,	
H6N1-2010,	 H7N7-2011	 and	 H10N9-2012	 were	 collected	 within	
spatial	 clusters	with	distances	between	 farms	 ranging	 from	0.6	 to	
6.9	km,	suggesting	 local	spread	between	farms	or	 independent	 in-
fections	by	 the	same	 local	 source.	Additionally,	 seropositive	 farms	
were	 detected	 within	 the	 same	 spatial	 cluster	 in	 potential	 cases	
H1N5-2007,	 H6N1-2010	 and	H10N9-2012,	 indicating	more	 farms	
were	infected	with	the	same	virus.	 Interestingly,	 in	potential	cases	
H1N5-2007	and	H10N9-2012,	two	infected	farms	within	the	same	
spatial	cluster	shared	the	same	owner.	Farms	 involved	 in	potential	
cases	 H5N3-2013	 and	 H6N2-2014	 were	 located	 at,	 respectively,	
21.3	and	18.5–68.9	km	distance,	indicating	long-distance	spread.
Finally,	poultry	 types	 involved	 in	potential	between-farm	trans-
mission	 cases	were	 examined.	 All	 genetically	 distinct	 viruses	were	
isolated	from	outdoor	chicken	layer	farms.	The	16	genetically	closely	
related	viruses	were	isolated	from	six	chicken	layer	farms	with	out-
door	 facilities	 (38%)	 and	 10	 farms	with	 an	 indoor	 housing	 system,	
including	 six	 turkey	 farms	 (38%),	 two	 duck	 farms	 (13%)	 and	 two	
chicken	 layer	 farms	 (13%).	 Potential	 spread	 within	 a	 poultry	 type	
was	 observed	 between	 farms	 infected	 with	 viruses	 H1N5-2007-1	
and	H1N5-2007-2	(turkeys),	H6N1-2010-1	and	H6N1-2010-2	(indoor	
chickens),	H10N9-2012-2	and	H10N9-2012-3	(turkeys),	H5N3-2013-1	
and	 H5N3-2013-2	 (outdoor	 chickens)	 and	 H6N2-2014-1	 and	
H6N2-2014-3	(domestic	ducks).	Within	the	spatial	clusters	of	poten-
tial	cases	H1N5-2007	and	H6N1-2010,	the	seropositive	farms	were	
of	the	same	poultry	type,	and	no	infections	were	detected	in	farms	
holding	 a	 different	 poultry	 type	 (Table	 S3).	 In	 contrast,	 potential	
spread	between	farms	holding	different	poultry	types	was	observed	
in	 farms	 infected	 with	 viruses	 H10N7-2009-1	 and	 H10N7-2009-2	
(turkeys–outdoor	 chickens),	 H7N7-2011-1	 and	 H7N7-2011-2	 (out-
door	chickens–turkeys),	H10N9-2012-1	and	 the	 two	other	 infected	
farms	 (outdoor	 chickens–turkeys)	 and	 H6N2-2014-2	 and	 the	 two	
other	 infected	 farms	 (outdoor	chickens–domestic	ducks).	The	com-
bined	results	suggest	that	between-farm	transmission	of	LPAI	viruses	
was	not	 related	 to	 indoor	or	outdoor	housing	 systems	 and	not	 re-
stricted	to	holdings	of	the	same	poultry	type.
4  | DISCUSSION
This	study	evaluates	the	contribution	of	between-farm	transmission	
to	the	overall	incidence	of	LPAI	virus	infections	in	commercial	poultry	
in	the	Netherlands.	We	analysed	serological	and	virological	detections	
TA B L E  1  Minority	variant	analysis	of	genetically	closely	related	low	pathogenic	avian	influenza	(LPAI)	viruses	isolated	from	potential	
between-farm	transmission	cases
Potential case Virus alignment
No. of nucleotide 
differences
No. of shared minority 
variants
No. of minority variants at 
consensus‐level variant sites
H1N5-2007 1–2 4 0 4
H10N7-2009 1–2 10 1 2
H6N1-2010 1–2 14 0 4
H7N7-2011 2–3 12 0 12
H10N9-2012 1–2 25 0 4
1–3 25 0 12
2–3 8 1 6
H5N3-2013 1–2 24 0 2
H6N2-2014 1–2 9 0 4
1–3 11 0 4
2–3 6 0 0
Note.	The	number	of	nucleotide	differences,	the	number	of	shared	minority	variants	(i.e.	minority	variants	that	are	present	in	both	viruses)	and	the	
number	of	minority	variants	at	consensus-level	variant	sites	(i.e.	minority	variants	at	sites	that	varied	between	viruses	at	consensus	level)	are	shown.	
Minority	variants	were	detected	using	a	minimum	frequency	of	2.0%	and	a	minimum	coverage	of	1,000	reads.	All	samples	were	collected	as	part	of	
the	national	avian	influenza	(AI)	surveillance	program	in	the	Netherlands	between	January	2006	and	September	2016.	Detailed	information	on	the	
virus	sequences	is	provided	in	Table	S1.
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of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	 to	 identify	 potential	 between-farm	 trans-
mission	 events.	 Subsequently,	 genetic	 analysis	was	 combined	with	
spatio-temporal	and	poultry	type	 information	to	 identify	epidemio-
logical	variables	associated	with	between-farm	transmission.	Over	a	
10-year	surveillance	period,	we	identified	35	potential	between-farm	
transmission	cases	involving	132	of	220	infected	poultry	farms.	We	
showed	 that	 in	 10	 of	 these	 cases	 farms	 clustered	 geographically.	
The	number	of	farms	involved	in	each	case	was	relatively	small	(2–7	
infected	 farms),	 as	 compared	 to	 previous	 LPAI	 virus	 outbreaks,	 in-
cluding	those	of	subtypes	H7N2	(1996–1998	and	2001–2002)	in	the	
United	States,	and	H7N1	(1999	and	2000–2001),	H7N3	(2002–2003	
and	2004)	and	H5N2	(2010–2012)	in	Italy,	that	reported	between	24	
and	388	infected	farms	(Capua	&	Alexander,	2004;	Mughini-Gras	et	
al.,	2014).	Some	subtypes	were	detected	in	multiple	years,	which	may	
be	due	 to	 recurrent	 virus	 introductions	 from	 the	wild	bird	popula-
tion.	However,	no	related	wild	bird	viruses	were	detected	in	the	same	
time	 frame	 between	2006	 and	 2011	 (Verhagen	 et	 al.,	 2017),	 or	 in	
recent	 years.	Also,	 none	of	 the	 viruses	were	 associated	with	HPAI	
outbreaks	that	were	reported	in	the	Netherlands	in	2014,	2016	and	
2017	(Beerens	et	al.,	2017,	2018;	Bouwstra	et	al.,	2015).
Genetic	 analysis	 was	 performed	 using	 the	 whole	 genome	 se-
quences	 of	 21	 LPAI	 viruses	 isolated	 from	 nine	 potential	 cases.	
This	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 viruses	 isolated	 from	 potential	 cases	
H8N4-2011	and	H7N7-2013	were	only	distantly	related.	Between-
farm	transmission	could	therefore	be	excluded	in	these	two	cases.	In	
addition,	virus	H7N7-2011-1	showed	low	sequence	identities	with	vi-
ruses	H7N7-2011-2	and	H7N7-2011-3	in	two	gene	segments,	which	
is	presumably	due	to	reassortment	of	gene	segments	between	co-
circulating	viruses.	Reassortment	events	are	commonly	observed	in	
wild	birds,	the	natural	host	of	a	vast	diversity	of	AI	viruses	(Macken,	
Webby,	&	Bruno,	2006).	Therefore,	reassortment	likely	occurred	in	
the	wild	bird	population	and	two	distinct	reassortment	variants	were	
subsequently	introduced	into	the	poultry	facilities	separately.
Genetically	closely	related	viruses,	showing	 less	than	0.3%	nu-
cleotide	sequence	divergence	in	each	gene	segment,	were	identified	
in	 seven	 of	 nine	 virologically	 analysed	 cases	 involving	 16	 poultry	
farms.	The	close	genetic	relationship	between	the	viruses	suggests	
between-farm	transmission	or	separate	introductions	from	the	same	
environmental	 source.	Neuraminidase	 stalk	 deletions	were	 identi-
fied	 in	potential	cases	H1N5-2007	and	H10N7-2009.	A	deletion	in	
the	NA	 stalk	 region	 is	 considered	 a	marker	 of	 virus	 adaptation	 to	
chickens,	turkeys	and	other	gallinaceous	hosts	(Li	&	Cardona,	2010;	
Li,	Zu	Dohna,	Cardona,	Miller,	&	Carpenter,	2011),	and	is	rarely	de-
tected	 in	wild	birds	without	a	 link	 to	poultry.	Neuraminidase	stalk	
deletions	cause	a	change	in	tropism	from	the	intestine	to	the	respi-
ratory	tract	in	chickens	(Hoffmann	et	al.,	2012;	Sorrell,	Song,	Pena,	
&	 Perez,	 2010),	 thereby	 increasing	 virus	 pathogenicity	 (Munier	 et	
al.,	2010).	The	length	and	position	of	NA	stalk	deletions	are	highly	
variable	(Li	et	al.,	2011).	The	fact	that	NA	stalk	deletions	of	identical	
length	and	position	were	identified	strongly	indicates	that	between-
farm	transmission	occurred.
Moreover,	 shared	 minority	 variants	 or	 minority	 variants	 at	
consensus-level	 variant	 sites	were	 identified	 in	 all	 seven	 potential	
between-farm	 transmission	 cases	of	 genetically	 closely	 related	 vi-
ruses.	These	minority	variants,	although	often	present	at	low	level,	
suggest	that	the	viruses	are	genetically	more	closely	related	than	pre-
dicted	based	on	the	consensus	sequence.	 Interestingly,	genetically	
closely	related	viruses	isolated	from	potential	cases	H1N5-2007	and	
H7N7-2011	showed	minority	variants	at	all	consensus-level	variant	
sites.	In	these	two	cases,	the	virus	on	the	secondary	infected	farm	
was	likely	isolated	shortly	after	direct	transmission	from	the	primary	
infected	farm	or	introduction	from	the	same	environmental	source.	
In	 contrast,	 a	 relatively	 low	 number	 of	minority	 variants	 together	
with	a	relatively	high	number	of	nucleotide	differences	in	potential	
case	H5N3-2013	 suggest	 prolonged	within-flock	 transmission	 be-
fore	samples	were	collected.	In	some	cases,	the	genetic	relationship	
based	on	minority	variants	may	be	underestimated	due	to	passaging	
of	the	virus	strains	in	eggs.
Surprisingly,	 minority	 variant	 analysis	 indicated	 that	 virus	
H10N9-2012-1	 was	 genetically	 more	 closely	 related	 to	 virus	
H10N9-2012-3	than	to	virus	H10N9-2012-2,	despite	the	larger	time	
interval	 between	 the	 collection	 dates.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 viruses	
H10N9-2012-1	 and	 H10N9-2012-2	 shared	 two	 fixed	 nucleotide	
variants	 that	were	not	present	 in	virus	H10N9-2012-3.	We	 there-
fore	hypothesize	that	the	virus	was	transmitted	from	H10N9-2012-1	
to	 H10N9-2012-2	 and	 H10N9-2012-3	 via	 another	 (seropositive)	
farm	within	 the	 same	 spatial	 cluster.	 This	hypothesis	 is	 supported	
by	 the	 relatively	 high	 number	 of	 nucleotide	 differences	 between	
virus	 H10N9-2012-1	 and	 the	 other	 two	 isolates.	Minority	 variant	
analysis	also	revealed	that	viruses	H6N2-2014-1	and	H6N2-2014-2	
shared	 four	 fixed	 nucleotide	 variants	 that	 were	 not	 present	 in	
virus	 H6N2-2014-3,	 and	 viruses	 H6N2-2014-1	 and	 H6N2-2014-3	
shared	two	fixed	nucleotide	variants	that	were	not	present	in	virus	
H6N2-2014-2.	No	minority	variants	were	identified	at	sites	that	dif-
fered	between	H6N2-2014-2	and	H6N2-2014-3.	Based	on	these	re-
sults,	we	assume	that	virus	H6N2-2014-1	acted	as	a	precursor	virus	
for	both	viruses	H6N2-2014-2	and	H6N2-2014-3.
Contact	 tracing	 to	 study	 the	 intensity	of	movements	between	
farms	could	reveal	potential	modes	of	transmission,	but	is	generally	
not	 performed	 for	 non-notifiable	 LPAI	 viruses.	Here,	we	 analysed	
other	epidemiological	links	between	farms,	such	as	the	time	interval	
between	virus	detections,	the	distance	between	farms	and	poultry	
types,	 to	 identify	variables	 that	may	be	associated	with	between-
farm	transmission.
Temporal	 analysis	 demonstrated	 that	 genetically	 closely	 re-
lated	viruses	were	detected	within	a	median	time	interval	of	8	days	
(range	1–36	days).	Previous	studies	have	shown	that	viral	shedding	
can	 already	 be	 observed	 from	 one	 day	 after	 experimental	 infec-
tion	 in	 chickens	 (Swayne	 &	 Beck,	 2005;	 van	 der	 Goot,	 de	 Jong,	
Koch,	&	Van	Boven,	2003).	The	mean	infectious	period	of	individ-
ual	 LPAI	 virus-infected	 birds	 was	 estimated	 to	 range	 between	 4	
and	 8	days	 (Comin,	 Klinkenberg,	Marangon,	 Toffan,	 &	 Stegeman,	
2011;	 Gonzales,	 van	 der	 Goot,	 Stegeman,	 Elbers,	 &	 Koch,	 2011;	
van	der	Goot	et	al.,	2003).	However,	the	duration	of	the	infectious	
period	 of	 an	 infected	 flock	 can	 take	much	 longer,	 depending	 on	
within-flock	 transmission	 dynamics	 influenced	 by	 the	 virus	 and	
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flock	characteristics,	such	as	poultry	type,	age	of	production	and	
the	 presence	 of	 concomitant	 diseases	 (Gonzales	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 At	
flock	level,	the	infectious	period	is	estimated	to	range	between	1	
and	2	months	for	chickens	 (Gonzales,	Boender,	Elbers,	Stegeman,	
&	de	Koeijer,	2014),	and	2	and	11	months	for	turkeys	(Comin	et	al.,	
2011).	This	is	much	longer	compared	to	HPAI,	as	most	LPAI	infec-
tions	 remain	subclinical	and	control	measures	are	not	applied	 for	
subtypes	other	 than	H5	and	H7.	The	 time	 intervals	 between	 the	
potential	cases	fall	within	the	estimated	infectious	period	of	LPAI	
virus-infected	 flocks	 and	 are	 therefore	 consistent	with	between-
farm	transmission.
Our	 study	 further	 suggests	 that	 both	 local	 and	 long-distance	
transmissions	 occurred	 and	 that	 between-farm	 transmission	 was	
not	 restricted	 to	 holdings	 of	 the	 same	 poultry	 type.	 Additionally,	
no	relation	was	found	between	indoor	or	outdoor	housing	systems	
and	potential	between-farm	transmission.	However,	despite	repre-
senting	only	2%	of	the	total	poultry	population	in	the	Netherlands,	
turkeys	were	 involved	 in	a	 relatively	high	number	of	potential	be-
tween-transmission	cases.	This	may	be	explained	by	a	higher	suscep-
tibility	of	this	species	to	AI	viruses	(Pillai,	Pantin-Jackwood,	Yassine,	
Saif,	&	Lee,	2010).	Interestingly,	all	genetically	distinct	viruses	were	
isolated	from	outdoor	chickens,	which	may	become	 infected	more	
easily	 through	 direct	 or	 indirect	 contact	 with	 wild	 birds	 (Koch	 &	
Elbers,	2006).
Potential	 local	 spread	within	 a	 poultry	 type	was	 observed	be-
tween	farms	infected	with	viruses	H1N5-2007-1	and	H1N5-2007-2,	
H6N1-2010-1	 and	 H6N1-2010-2	 and	 H10N9-2012-2	 and	
H10N9-2012-3.	 During	 these	 events,	 transmission	 may	 have	 oc-
curred	 via	 movement	 of	 persons	 or	 contaminated	 equipment	 be-
tween	neighbouring	farms,	which	 is	 likely	 to	occur	between	farms	
of	 the	 same	 poultry	 type	 because	 of	 a	 high	 probability	 of	 shared	
personnel,	 equipment	 and	 transport	 services	 (Leibler	 et	 al.,	 2010;	
McQuiston	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Thomas	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Vieira	 et	 al.,	 2009).	
This	 transmission	 route	 is	 supported	by	 the	 fact	 that	no	 influenza	
infections	were	detected	in	farms	holding	a	different	poultry	type	in	
potential	cases	H1N5-2007	and	H6N1-2010,	and	two	infected	farms	
in	 potential	 cases	 H1N5-2007	 and	H10N9-2012	 shared	 the	 same	
owner.	Since	AI	viruses	can	persist	for	extended	periods	in	the	envi-
ronment	(Brown	et	al.,	2009;	Thompson	&	Bennett,	2017),	transport	
of	contaminated	materials	is	also	considered	an	important	route	of	
virus	spread	over	long	distances	(Mulatti	et	al.,	2010).	Between-farm	
transmission	 via	 human-mediated	 transport	was	 therefore	 consid-
ered	the	most	probable	route	of	transmission	for	potential	long-dis-
tance	 spread	within	a	poultry	 type,	which	was	observed	between	
farms	 infected	with	 viruses	H5N3-2013-1	 and	H5N3-2013-2,	 and	
H6N2-2014-1	and	H6N2-2014-3.
Alternatively,	virus	may	have	been	transmitted	between	neigh-
bouring	farms	by	vectors	(Velkers	et	al.,	2017;	Wanaratana	et	al.,	
2013)	or	via	airborne	transmission	when	virus	particles	or	virus-con-
taminated	dust	particles	are	being	dispersed	into	the	environment	
(Jonges	et	 al.,	 2015;	 Spekreijse	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 These	 transmission	
routes	 may	 explain	 potential	 local	 spread	 between	 farms	 hold-
ing	different	poultry	types,	which	were	observed	between	farms	
infected	 with	 viruses	 H10N7-2009-1	 and	 H10N7-2009-2,	 and	
H7N7-2011-2	and	H7N7-2011-3,	and	from	H10N9-2012-1	to	the	
other	infected	farms.	During	the	latter	event,	virus	was	detected	
in	air	samples	up	to	60	metres	downwind	of	two	infected	turkey	
farms	2–9	days	after	infection	was	confirmed	(Jonges	et	al.,	2015).	
However,	 detection	decreased	 rapidly	with	distance.	Hence,	 the	
probability	 of	 between-flock	 transmission	 by	 air	 decreases	with	
increasing	distance	(Boender	et	al.,	2007;	Ssematimba,	Hagenaars,	
&	de	Jong,	2012)	and	will	depend	heavily	on	environmental	condi-
tions,	such	as	wind	(Ypma	et	al.,	2013).	In	addition,	most	potential	
transmission	 events	 occurred	 between	 farms	 with	 indoor	 facili-
ties,	suggesting	airborne	transmission	is	less	likely	because	of	me-
chanical	barriers.
In	conclusion,	our	study	 indicates	that	between-farm	transmis-
sion	occurred	 in	 seven	of	 nine	 virologically	 analysed	 cases.	Based	
on	 these	 findings,	 transmission	 between	poultry	 farms	 likely	 con-
tributes	 considerably	 to	 the	 incidence	 of	 LPAI	 virus	 infections	 in	
poultry,	although	separate	introductions	from	the	wild	bird	reservoir	
cannot	be	excluded.	In	this	study,	genetic	analysis	was	limited	to	few	
potential	between-farm	transmission	cases	for	which	virus	was	iso-
lated.	More	frequent	collection	of	samples	for	virological	monitoring	
of	non-notifiable	LPAI	viruses	in	poultry	would	be	of	great	value	to	
obtain	more	knowledge	on	LPAI	virus	 transmission	dynamics.	This	
study	highlights	the	value	of	genetic	analysis	to	complement	sero-
logical	data	and	to	 improve	epidemiological	 investigations	on	LPAI	
virus	 transmissions,	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 guide	 disease	 control	
strategies.
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